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I. INTRODUCTION
When should a mistake of fact excuse an otherwise criminal act? Some
might say that the question betrays confusion or anachronism. Confusion,
because mistakes of fact are not excuses. They are so-called failure of proof
defenses. Anachronism, because thinking about mistakes of fact as excuses
harkens back to an older understanding of the guilty mind as mens rea, whereas
modem thinking has replaced mens rea with mentes reae. But the question
does make sense, and the older way of thinking about the guilty mind has its
virtues.
Here I advance two claims. First, a mistake (or ignorance) of fact should
matter only insofar as it causes an actor to be ignorant of the law. Mistakes of
fact should have exculpatory force if and only if they cause ignorance of the
law, and ignorance of the law ought to be an excuse to criminal liability.
Second, an actor who should otherwise be excused because he is ignorant of the
law, where that ignorance is the result of some mistake of fact, should not lose
that excuse just because the underlying mistake of fact can, in a plausible and
legitimate sense, be characterized as "unreasonable."
* Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Cornell Law School. I presented this
paper at the 2009 Criminal Law Symposium, Excuses and the Criminal Law, held at Texas Tech University
School of Law on April 3, 2009. 1 would like to thank the editors of the Texas Tech Law Review for all their
hard work, Professor Arnold Loewy for inviting me to participate, and the conference participants for their
helpful comments. Thanks also to John Blume, Sherry Colb, and Jens Ohlin for their thoughts on an earlier
draft.
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Each of these claims can be understood as a plea, or dependent upon a
plea, for a broad construal of the excuses. The first presupposes that ignorance
of the law should excuse, whereas the law now recognizes only limited
exceptions to the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The second
says that an actor whose ignorance of the law is the result of a mistake of fact
should be excused, even if that mistake was "unreasonable," whereas the law
commonly withholds exculpatory force from mistakes of fact if and when those
mistakes are "unreasonable."
II. WHEN SHOULD A MISTAKE OF FACT EXCUSE?
We are accustomed to thinking that mistakes of fact are more or less the
legislature's business. A legislature is free within broad constitutional limits to
say what mental states the defendant must have with respect to this or that
element of an offense. We are not in the habit of asking whether a particular
mistake of fact should really matter, or why. Instead, figuring out whether a
mistake of fact matters is simply a matter of reading the statute and figuring out
what the legislature intended. What, if any, mental state did the legislature
want to apply to this or that material element? Having figured that out, has the
prosecution discharged its burden of proving the existence of that mental state
beyond a reasonable doubt? If not, the defendant has a "defense," which we
call a failure-of-proof defense: the state's proof on that point has failed.
This way of thinking about mistakes of fact is of course the right way to
think about them as a matter of positive law. Mistakes of fact are indeed
failure-of-proof defenses. But for some reason we have stopped thinking about
mistakes of fact beyond the way in which the positive law tells us to think about
them. We have stopped asking why, if at all, a mistake of fact should preclude
criminal liability, apart from the fact that positive law says so. In other words,
we have stopped asking why a mistake of fact might, if at all, constitute a
genuine excuse. We argue about what, for example, duress and insanity are,
and given what they are, why they should deflect criminal liability. But hardly
a word can lately be heard about when or why a mistake of fact should afford a
defense to liability-other than to say that the legislature says so.
No one would say that reading the statutes describing the circumstances
under which an actor can state a valid defense of duress or insanity in this or
that jurisdiction would provide an adequate theoretical understanding of duress
or insanity as defenses to criminal liability. Nor should anyone say that all it
1. For notable exceptions, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 155 (1998)
("Determining the difference between relevant and irrelevant mistakes is, at bottom, a philosophical problem
-not one legislators can solve simply as an act of will."); George P. Fletcher, Mistake in the Model Penal
Code: A False False Problem, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 649, 653 (1988) ("[D]eferring to the legislature does not
solve the problem of mistakes as a matter of principle."); Sanford Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV.
257, 261 (1987) ("[M]istake [is an] excuse[], despite [its] formal character as definitional mens rea
requirements. Indeed, before the clarifying analysis of mens rea by the Model Penal Code, this was how...
mistake[s] were traditionally thought of.").
360 [Vol. 42:359
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takes to gain an adequate theoretical understanding of mistakes of fact is to
read the statute describing the mental states a legislature has declared an actor
must have with respect to this or that element of the offense. An adequate
theory of mistakes of fact would tell us why a mistake of fact matters to an
actor's liability to criminal blame and punishment, and once we know why
mistakes of fact matter we should be able to tell when this or that mistake does
matter.
Most folks say that duress and insanity matter because they excuse. An
insane actor or an actor acting under duress has done something the criminal
law regards as impermissible, but the law nonetheless withholds its censure.
Such actors are not to be blamed. One could of course go on to ask: Why do
duress and insanity excuse? The most common answers have something to do
with claims to the effect that the insane actor or the actor acting under duress
lacked the capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, or
lacked a fair opportunity to do so, or did not display through their actions an
attitude of malice or contempt or whatnot.
Mistakes of fact should likewise be portrayed as excuses, or more
precisely, a mistake of fact should "excuse" if and when it causes an actor to be
ignorant of the fact that he is doing something the law does not permit him to
do, or fails to do something the law obligates him to do. In other words,
mistakes of fact matter only inasmuch as they cause the actor to be in what is a
genuine excusing condition; namely, ignorance of the law. Indeed, it seems to
me that, with respect to the epistemic side of responsibility, ignorance of law is
the only genuine excuse around.
The difference between portraying a mistake of fact as (merely) a potential
failure of proof defense and portraying it instead as a potential basis for an
excuse is the flip side of the difference between what has been called an
elemental approach to assessing an actor's guilty mind and a so-called
culpability approach to it,2 or in other words, between mentes reae and mens
rea.3 A mistake of fact matters on an elemental approach to the guilty mind if
and when the mistake means that the actor did not possess the mental state, if
any, that the statute itself requires: if it negates one of the required mentes reae.
In contrast, a mistake of fact matters on a culpability approach if and when it
negates mens rea.
Yet what does mens rea mean? What does it mean to say that an actor
possessed a guilty mind according to the so-called (and sometimes derided)
2. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 10.02[B]-[C] (5th ed. 2006);
Jeremy Horder, A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 759; Paul
H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and
Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983).
3. Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD
LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 404 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934) ("An intelligent understanding of the various states of
mind requisite for criminality can be gained only through an intensive study of the substantive law covering
each separate group. The old conception ofmens rea must be discarded, and in its place must be substituted
the new conception of mentes reae.").
2009]
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culpability approach? I suggest that an actor lacks mens rea when he does not
realize that his act or omission is one the law categorically forbids. Moreover,
he lacks mens rea because, not having realized that his act or omission is a
crime, he has not acted in defiance of the law's legitimate authority.4
Consequently, a mistake of fact should constitute an excuse if and when it
causes the actor to be ignorant of the law: whenever it causes an actor to be
unaware that he is acting in a way the law does not permit him to act, or that he
is failing to act in a way it demands he act.5 A mistake of fact gains whatever
exculpatory force it has if and only if it renders an actor ignorant of the fact that
the law prohibits his conduct, in which case the actor cannot be said to have
acted in defiance of the law, in which case it can be said that he acted without
mens rea.
But ignorance of the law never excuses, right? Ingorantia legis non
excusat. Everyone is presumed to know the law, and that presumption is not
open to rebuttal.6 Moreover, even when the law does permit ignorance of the
law to excuse, it does so only when and because it regards the actor's ignorance
as reasonable, and the law is famously stingy in what it regards as reasonable
ignorance. Rarely does it meet a claim of ignorance of law it likes. If the
criminal prohibition itself makes ignorance a defense; 7 if it is unpublished; 8 if
a high-ranking state actor tells you that what you are about to do is not a crime,9
or if your ignorance stems from mental disease or defect,'0 then and only then
will your mistaken belief that you committed no crime protect you from the
law's condemnation.
Yet despite the law's de facto reluctance to entertain pleas of excuse based
on ignorance of law, the idea that everyone is conclusively presumed to know
the law gives the game away. It reveals that the law, far from being indifferent
as to whether or not those subject to its sanctions are aware of its demands,
4. See JEAN HAMPTON, Mens Rea, in THE INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS 72, 102-06 (Daniel Famhani
ed., 2007) [hereinafter HAMPTON, Mens Rea]; Jean Hampton, The Nature ofImmorality, 7 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y 22, 39 (1989) ("[T]he source of human immorality [lies in] 'foul revolt[,]' [i.e., defiance]."). Some
might object that this account of mens rea somehow presupposes an unpalatable authoritarian and illiberal
understanding of the state's relationship to those over whom it claims authority. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Rule-
Violations and Wrongdoings, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY 47, 52 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002);
Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility ofa General Theory, 12 LAW & PHIL. 193, 198 (1993)
("Surely only the most obsessively authoritarian legal theory... could possibly suggest that what marks out
intentional killing or rape as criminally culpable is not the nature of the harm or the way in which it was
caused, but simply the defiance of the law the action evinced."). Suffice it for now to say that this account of
mens rea presupposes that obedience to legitimate authority is indeed a virtue, keeping in mind that obedience
is one thing; blind obedience another.
5. Indeed, inasmuch as the law itself-what the law is-is itself a social fact, all mistakes of law are
ultimately mistakes of fact.
6. 4 WnLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27 ("[Lvery person of discretion.., is bound and
presumed to know the law.").
7. DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 13.02[A].
8. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(a) (1985). Cf Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957).
9. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (1985).
10. See, e.g., id. § 4.01(1).
[Vol. 42:359
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cares so much that it not only presumes that everyone is aware of those
demands, it sets that presumption in stone. Thus, ignorance of the law does
excuse-in theory. It fails to excuse in fact only because the law imagines that
no one suffers from such ignorance, and it won't listen to anyone who says that
he does.
The legal fiction that everyone knows the law might have made some
sense in days gone by, when the criminal law's jurisdiction extended only so
far as malum in se.11 But today's criminal law has expanded its jurisdiction. It
now extends well beyond malum in se and deep into malum prohibitum, and
the number of malum prohibitum offenses is large. Indeed, no one really
knows, for example, how many federal regulations have the backing of the
criminal law.12 In a world so full of malumprohibitum crimes, the presumption
makes considerably less sense. Refusing to have sympathy for the sound-of-
mind robber who claims that he was unaware of the law's prohibition against
using violence to take someone else's property, never again to return it, is one
thing. Refusing to have sympathy for the guy who claims not to have realized
that selling "Woodsy Owl" T-shirts for a quick buck was a federal crime
(unless he had gotten permission from the Chief of the Forest Service to do so)
is another.
13
If the law refuses to have sympathy for the Woodsy Owl entrepreneur, it
would likely defend its hard-heartedness by appeal to cold calculation. The
most common defense of the law's de facto no-mistake maxim is utilitarian, a
defense usually associated with Holmes: The rule achieves benefits or avoids
costs that would otherwise result, and those achieved benefits or avoided costs
are worth the injustice done when an actor is punished for a crime he had no
clue he was committing. "[J]ustice to the individual," said Holmes "is rightly
outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scale."'14 But notice
again how this defense of the no-mistake maxim presupposes that, but for its
supposed costs and benefits, ignorance of the law would be an excuse: an
excuse that justice to the individual would require the law to recognize. Of
11. Even then, James Fitzjames Stephen said that the "statement that everyone is conclusively presumed
to know the law... [is] a presumption opposed to notorious facts, and closely resembling a forged release to a
forged bond." JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 72 (2d
ed. 1890).
12. Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case
Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 648 (2006).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 771a (2006 & Supp. 2009); 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.22,272.4(2009). No reported cases cite
18 U.S.C. § 771a, so hopefully no one has in fact been prosecuted for such misbehavior. For more fun
examples of kooky crimes, see Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
704-09 (2005). Wlen people speak of"overcriminalization" they usually mean that the law has criminalized
conduct that does neither causes nor risks immediate harm. The criminal law makes more conduct criminal
than the harm principle (properly understood) would permit. Overcriminalization is therefore objectionable
insofar as a liberal state ought not to criminalize conduct that neither causes nor risks harm. But
overcriminalization is also objectionable insofar as it permits the state to condemn and punish a person who
had no idea he was committing a crime.
14. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881).
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course, it should come as no surprise that utilitarianism is no friend of
ignorance of the law as an excuse: utilitarianism is no friend of any excuse.15
In any event, if one begins from the premise that mens rea consists in
defiance of the law's legitimate authority, then the conclusion that ignorance of
law should be an excuse is hard to resist. Indeed, it seems tautologically true.
Moreover, if an actor's ignorance of the law can be traced to a mistake of fact,
then his mistake of fact should then constitute what might, for want of a better
term, be called a "derivative excuse." An actor can of course be ignorant of the
law without being ignorant of any of the elements of the crime with which he is
charged. But sometimes a mistake of fact can cause an actor to be ignorant of
the law, and when it does, it should form the basis upon which the actor is
excused.
A. From Mistake of Fact to Ignorance of Law
The simplest way in which a mistake of fact can cause an actor to be
ignorant of the law arises when the mistake is the cause but for which the actor
would have at least suspected he was committing a crime. Consider Staples v.
United States16 The defendant Harold Staples was charged with possessing an
"unregistered firearm" in violation of the National Firearms Act. The weapon
he possessed, which was in fact unregistered, was an AR- 15 that had been
modified to enable it to fire automatically. Indeed, the capacity to fire
automatically was what made it a "firearm" within the meaning of the statute.
Staples insisted that he had made a mistake of fact: He mistakenly believed that
the unregistered weapon he possessed could not fire automatically. 7
But why should his mistake matter? It should matter if and because, had
he not made it, he would have realized, or at least suspected, that the law
prohibited him from continuing to possess his AR-15, or at least that it required
him to register it.18 Had he been aware of the fact that his AR-15 could fire
automatically, he would have done some asking around, as a result of which he
might have come to realize that weapons capable of firing automatically must
be registered in order to be lawfully possessed. His mistake of fact therefore
15. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 1, at 263-64.
16. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). The line of cases into which Staples falls can be read
for the general proposition that, wherever possible, the federal courts should interpret federal criminal statutes
so as to require the government to prove that the defendant was aware of those material elements of the
offense sufficient to warrant the inference that the defendant at least suspected that he was committing a crime
in acting or not acting as he did. Cf John Shepard Wiley, Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REv. 1021, 1023, 1029 (1999) ("When reading
[federal criminal] statutes, the Justices['] . . . interpretive method makes moral culpability mandatory for
criminal conviction," where "moral culpability" means that the actor has broken a "law[] about which [he]
knew or should have known.").
17. Staples argued that the statute should be interpreted so as to require the government to prove that he
knew the weapon could fire automatically. He prevailed on that argument. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 602.
18. If Staples realized that the AR-15 could fire automatically but still had no suspicion that its
unregistered possession was a crime, I would continue to say that he should be excused.
[Vol. 42:359
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gains exculpatory force because, having failed to realize that the weapon in his
possession could fire automatically, he failed in turn to realize, or even suspect,
that his continued possession of it (without registering it) was illegal. An actor
whose mistake of fact leaves him with not even a suspicion that he might be
acting as the law says he ought not to act should be excused for so acting.
On the other hand, if an actor does suspect that 9-ing is illegal, then he is
obligated to take reasonable steps that, had he taken them, would have
confirmed his suspicion, resulting in the formation of the belief that (-ing is a
crime. If he fails to take those steps, such that he continues to suspect that 9-
ing is illegal, he should refrain from 9-ing. An actor who suspects that the law
prohibits (p-ing but 9's all the same is nonetheless defiant, even if he is less
defiant than one who fully realizes that the law prohibits 9-ing. Indeed, if he
can be characterized as "willfully ignorant" of the law's demands, he might
fairly be regarded as equally defiant. 19
Now imagine an actor who suspects that 9-ing is a crime and who
accordingly sets out to confirm or dispel his suspicion. Based on his
investigation, he dispels his suspicion and ends up believing that the law
permits him to p. He turns out to be wrong, such that when he p's he acts in
ignorance of the law's demand not to 9. One such case is People v. Marrero.
20
The defendant Julio Marrero was a guard at a federal prison in
Connecticut. He was charged with possessing an unlicensed pistol outside a
New York City nightclub in violation of New York law. Marrero's pistol was
in fact unlicensed, but he believed federal prison guards weren't required to
license their pistols. Why not? Because under New York law, "peace officers"
were not subject to the licensing requirement, 21 and a "peace officer" included a
46 . ,22guard of any state prison or of any penal correctional institution. As a
prison guard at a federal prison, Marrero believed that he was a "guard ... of
[a] penal correctional institution," and as such, exempt from the licensing
requirement. He turned out to be wrong. The language on which he relied was
19. The idea here would be to apply the willful ignorance doctrine, which ordinarily applies to ignorance
of facts, to ignorance of law. The proper formulation of the willful doctrine is controversial, but having said
that, I believe it is best understood as follows: An actor will be treated as if he believed (or knew) thatp if he
suspected thatp, could easily have gathered additional information or evidence to confirm his suspicion (i.e.,
he could easily have done something to confirm his suspicion), and had no reason sufficient to justify not
having done so. In other words, the willful blindness doctrine is a forfeiture rule based upon an actor's
omission: an actor who would otherwise have a failure-of-proof defense based on the fact that he did not
know of a particular fact's existence will forfeit that defense if he fails to act under the circumstances the
willful blindness doctrine specifies.
Similarly, an actor can fairly be treated as if he realized that p-ing was a crime if he suspected that 'p-
ing was a crime, could have taken reasonable steps to confirm his suspicion, and had no reason sufficient to
justify not having taken those steps. I would add, however, that the actor must realize or at least suspect that
he is obligated to take reasonable steps, that any steps he has taken fall short of the steps he should have taken,
and that his reasons for not taking those additional steps are not enough to justify not taking them.
20. People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987).
21. People v. Marrero, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384, 347 (App. Div. 1979) (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 265.20(a)(i)(a)).
22. Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(33)(h)).
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later construed such that the exemption for "peace officer[s]" included only
guards of "any state prison or of any [state] penal correctional institution."
Marrero was a guard at a federal prison. As such, he was not "peace officer,"
and not being a peace officer, his pistol was not lawfully possessed unless and
until it was licensed. 3
Unlike Staples, Marrero was well aware of the language of the law he was
charged with having violated. He had read the statute. Unfortunately for him,
it turned out that he had misread it. One might therefore say that Marrero was
not like Staples: Marrero made a mistake of law regarding the law he was
charged with violating, whereas Staples was ignorant of the law under which
he was charged. Perhaps, but any such distinction is one without a difference.
What matters is that Marrero was ignorant of the fact that his possession of the
unlicensed pistol was something the law did not permit, just as Staples was
ignorant of the fact that his possession of an unregistered firearm (i.e., a
weapon that could fire automatically) was something the law did not permit.
Just like Staples, he did not act in defiance of the law, and just like Staples, his
violation of the law should have been excused for lack of mens rea.24 He
violated the law, but he did not defy it.
But perhaps that conclusion is too quick. Perhaps Marrero is not quite as
sympathetic as he might first appear. He appears at first blush to have been
someone who tried in good faith to obey the law. But if we imagine that
Marrero believed in his heart of hearts that it was wrong to carry an unlicensed
pistol outside a nightclub in the City, but did so anyway because he also
believed the law permitted him to do so, a different Marrero emerges: Marrero
the loopholer.25 His reason for looking so closely into the law was not so much
to honor it, but to find a gap in it that he could exploit. Moreover, one might
say that the law should not tolerate, let alone encourage, the search for
loopholes. Refusing to excuse an actor who believes, even reasonably, that the
law permits him to engage in conduct he otherwise believes to be wrongful (or
believes that most others believe to be wrongful), is one way to discourage it.
26
23. Marrero argued in the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it refused to permit him to
raise a mistake of law defense under New York Penal Law § 15.20. The Court of Appeals rejected that
argument. See Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1068.
24. Marrero was in fact convicted and his conviction upheld on appeal against various challenges. See
id.
25. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 127, 141 (1997) (detailing facts suggesting that Marrero was a loopholer).
26. See, e.g., id. at 139. See also Livingston Hall& Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of LawandMens Rea, 8
U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 647 (1940) (arguing that any general defense of ignorance of law should not extend to an
actor who realizes that his act "was morally wrong according to the mores"); Peter Westen, Two Rules of
Legality, 26 LAW & PHIL. 229, 258-59 (2007); Douglas Husak, Culpability and Mistake of Law 3 (Sept. 9,
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Bear in mind that insofar as Marrero was a loopholer, he
was a failed one: He believed that he had discovered a loophole where none existed. A successful loopholer
is one who finds what is indeed a loophole in the law. The successful loopholer is no less lacking in virtue
than is the failed one, but he is nonetheless immune to criminal liability thanks to the principle of legality. His
act or omission is not a crime, even though we are prepared to agree that it should be.
[Vol. 42:359
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Now, most actors who believe that (p-ing is wrong are also apt to suspect
that qp-ing is a crime. Indeed, that suspicion is what launches the loopholer on
his search for the hoped-for loophole, as a result of which he confidently
concludes, mistakenly but much to his satisfaction, that he can indeed (p without
getting into trouble with the law. So what should the law do with the
loopholer? Should it excuse him, as it ordinarily should when someone acts in
ignorance of the law, or should it create an exception for him, censuring him
despite his ignorance?
On the one hand, one might say that the loopholer is the "bad man"
Holmes made famous,27 keeping in mind that the bad man could for Holmes
nonetheless be a good citizen, because he obeyed the law, and obedience is all
that good citizenship required. On the other hand, one might insist that the
loopholer is not only a bad man, he's also a bad citizen, because he disobeyed
his conscience or defied prevailing social norms, doing what he believed was
wrong, or what he believed others believed was wrong. Who's right depends of
course on what it takes to make a citizen good. If a good citizen is, as some
have said, a virtuous citizen, then Holmes' detractors are on the side of the
angels. But if, as Holmes said, a good citizen is an obedient citizen, even if not
a virtuous one, then surely a bad man can be a good citizen, and if defiance
inculpates, as the defiance account of the guilty mind supposes, then obedience
-and obedience alone-should excuse. Indeed, can a liberal state legitimately
insist that good citizenship demands not just good-faith obedience, but virtue as
well?
28
Now consider Cheek v. UnitedStates.29 The defendant John Cheek was a
pilot for American Airlines. He doubtless made a respectable living on the
wages he earned in thatjob. He nonetheless failed to pay income tax on those
wages, and he was duly prosecuted for tax evasion. The reason he gave for not
paying his taxes was simple. The wages he earned as a pilot were not, he
insisted, "income" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, and
having no other source of "income," he defied no law when he failed to file a
tax return. He had no "income" to declare.
27. Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
28. Kahan argues that defining crimes in vague terms and refusing to recognize ignorance of the law as
an excuse are both ways of deterring loopholers. See Kahan, supra note 25, at 139; see also Samuel W. Buell,
The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1546-53 (2008). That may well be true, but I would
prefer a world in which the law recognized ignorance of the law as an excuse while continuing to use vague
language to define criminal prohibitions. An actor who encounters a criminal prohibition he believes to be
vague-maybe it prohibits q-ing or maybe it does not-will at least suspect that the law prohibits ping, and if
he does so suspect, he proceeds at his own risk if he decides to q) and in fact it turns out that the law does not
permit q-ing. But an actor who encounters a prohibition he believes without doubt permits q-ing, but which
in fact prohibits q-ing, should be excused on the basis of his ignorance.
29. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). Cheek also raised the following problem: What
should happen to a defendant who realizes that p-ing is a crime but believes that Congress lacked the
constitutional authority to make p-ing a crime, such that it should not have been a crime at all? See id. at 204-
07. Such an actor admits to having acted in defiance of one authority, albeit in allegiance to what he believes
is a higher one.
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Cheek did not claim to have made any factual mistake on the way to his
belief that his pilot wages were not income. Indeed, Cheek knew, or so it
would seem, all the facts he needed to know in order to form the belief that his
pilot wages were indeed "income" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code, including the "relevant provisions of the Code or regulations, of court
decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of
the Internal Revenue Service,... [and] of the personal income tax return forms
and accompanying instructions," 30 all of which "made it plain that wages
should be returned as income. 3 1 But then how could it be that Cheek
nonetheless believed that his wages were not "income?" Maybe he was simply
lying. But what if he was telling the truth? What sense, if any, could we make
of his state of mind then?
Perhaps he was self-deceived. He wanted to believe that his wages were
not income, and so despite everything the evidence was telling him, his reason
failed to reach that conclusion, or his mind failed to register it, with desire
being the culprit either way. If so, did Cheek possess a "guilty mind"?
It depends on the depth of his self-deception. If his self-deception slipped
into delusion, then despite all the evidence available to him, he would have
experienced nothing to alert him to the possibility that his wages were indeed
income, and such full-blown ignorance of law should excuse. On the other
hand, run-of-the mill self-deception is an irrational state of mind, and as such,
constitutes a nagging source of anxiety. The self-deceived actor, we say,
"knows the truth in his heart," and if he does, then he has some dim awareness
of the truth, and assuming that he could have become fully aware of it, perhaps
through the exercise of a little critical self-reflection, he should have. If Cheek
honestly believed that his wages were not "income," but was at the same time
dimly aware that they were, then his mind was still guilty, and he should have
paid his taxes.
Mistakes of fact sometimes cause an actor to be ignorant of the law, and
when they do, such ignorance should, all else being equal, constitute an excuse.
An actor who acts in ignorance of his legal obligations does not defy the law
and thus lacks a guilty mind. An actor's ignorance of the law can of course be
attributable to causes other than ignorance of fact. Moral obtuseness and
ignorance of prevailing social norms are two other causes that come quickly to
mind. Should an actor be excused if his ignorance of the law traces its origin,
not to a mistake of fact, but to these failings?
I'm inclined to say yes. An actor who commits a crime in complete
ignorance of the law should be excused, period. If the cause of the actor's
ignorance-whether that cause is ignorance of fact, morality, prevailing social
norms, or whatnot-is itself a result of the actor having done or having failed to
do something in defiance of the law's demands, then the actor can fairly be
30. Id. at 205.
31. Id.
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punished for that defiant act or omission, assuming the law makes that act or
omission a crime. Indeed, he might also be punished for any foreseen
consequence that proximately results from that act or omission, assuming that
we can rightly be held responsible for such consequences. But he cannot fairly
be punished for the act or omission he does in ignorance of the law's demands
(unless that ignorance happens itself to be a foreseen consequence). With
respect to that act or omission, he lacks a guilty mind.
B. From Mistake of Fact to Ignorance of Some Law
A mistake of fact might cause an actor, not to be ignorant of the fact that
he is committing a crime, but ignorant instead of how great a crime he is
committing. Consider Regina v. Prince.32 English law made it a crime to take
a girl under sixteen out of the possession and against the will of the girl's father
or mother. The defendant Henry Prince believed that Annie Phillips, the girl he
was taking out of the possession and against the will of her father or mother,
was eighteen. It turned out she was fourteen, and as such, Prince did what the
law demanded he not do: take an under-sixteen girl away from her parents
without their consent.
Everyone agreed that Prince's mistake as to the girl's age was reasonable,
and ordinarily such a mistake would have been a defense. Unfortunately for
Prince, most of the judges hearing his appeal believed that he was nonetheless
guilty of doing something he realized was wrong (albeit apparently not
criminal); to wit, taking any girl out of the possession and against the will of
her father or mother.33 As such he lost whatever exculpatory force his mistake
of fact would otherwise have had. Taking an eighteen year-old girl might be
less serious than taking a fourteen year-old, but it was still wrong, as Prince
presumably realized. Prince chose to cross the line into wrongdoing (albeit not
criminal wrongdoing), and having decided to take that step, he was on the line
for the more serious (and criminal) wrong he committed.
Prince is commonly cited for what has become known as the "moral
wrong" doctrine, which also comes in a legal variety, known appropriately
enough as the "legal wrong" doctrine. Both doctrines are really canons of
construction. 34 If the mental state associated with an element of an offense is
32. R. v. Prince, 2 L.R.C.C.R. 154 (1875). Some facts about which an actor might be ignorant will or
ought to have no plausible bearing on the seriousness of the crime, and as such, should have no impact on the
punishment he deserves. Facts whose only importance is to establish jurisdiction come to mind.
33. I'm assuming not only that what Prince did was wrong, but that he realized it was wrong. Cf. id. at
170 ("[A]s the case is reserved we must take it as proved that the prisoner knew that the girl was in the
possession of her father, and that he took her knowing that he trespassed on the father's rights, and has no
colour of excuse for so doing.") (judgment of Blackburn, J.).
34. See id. at 173 ("The question in this case depends on the construction of the statute under which the
prisoner is indicted.") (judgment of Bramwell, B.). The approach set forth in Prince is no longer followed in
English law, under which a "requirement of mens rea should [today] be presumed unless there were clear
contrary indications." ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 8.6(d), (4th ed. 2003) (citing B
v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [2000] A.C. 428, and K, [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. 121). England's Sexual Offenses
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uncertain, the fact that the elements with respect to which the actor is aware add
up to a lesser wrong, either moral or legal, then (all else being equal) it matters
not that the actor is unaware (even reasonably so) of the element in question,
where that element makes his wrong a greater wrong. With respect to that
element, strict liability applies." Thus, although the statute under which Prince
was charged would ordinarily have been read such that an honest and
reasonable mistake with respect to the girl's age would have precluded liability,
the fact that anyone in Prince's situation would (in the majority's view) be
doing wrong despite being reasonably mistaken about the girl's age meant that
the statute would instead be read to impose strict liability with respect to that
element.
The moral and legal wrong doctrines reflect the idea that if you skate on
thin ice, and you know the ice is thin, then don't complain if you are unlucky
enough to fall through.36 Inasmuch as the doctrines provide support for strict
liability, they have few modem-day defenders.37 Most contemporary observers
reject the doctrines because they lead to punishment disproportionate to
culpability, where an actor's culpability depends on what, if any, cognitive
mental states he possessed with respect to each of the material elements of the
offense charged. An actor who believes that all the elements exist is more
culpable than one who believes that only some of them exist, and their
respective punishments should reflect their differential culpability. Of course,
this criticism begs the question: it presupposes a mentes reae conception of the
Act 2003 does, however, describe some offenses with respect to which the legislative intent apparently was to
impose strict liability regarding the victim's age. See ASHWORTH, supra § 8.6(a).
35. Cf. Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 802 (Md. 1993) (noting that "[s]tatutory rape laws are often
justified on the 'lesser legal wrong' theory or the 'moral wrong theory,"' though not embracing that
justification). The felony murder rule has been defended along similar grounds. See Nelson E. Roth & Scott
E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446,
458 (1985) ("The felony-murder rule thus partly operated on an unarticulated rationale that one who does bad
acts cannot complain about being punished for their consequences, no matter how unexpected.").
36. See Knuller v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435,463 (Lord Morris) ("Those who skate on
thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which will denote the precise spot where they may fall in."); see also
Douglas Husak, Strict Liability, Justice, Proportionality, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 81, 98-99 (A.P.
Simester ed., 2005). This thin-ice principle bears some resemblance to the canon-law doctrine ofversanti in
re illicitae imputantur omni guae sequentur ox delicto, i.e., one acting unlawfully is held responsible for all
the consequences of his conduct, which some commentators identify as the historical source of the felony
murder rule, see Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635,656-57, although not equivalent to it. See Guyora
Binder, The Origins ofAmerican Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 74 (2004).
37. But see John Gardner, On the General Part of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 204,244 (Antony Duffed., 1998) ("[T]he requirement of subjective mens rea introduced by
the obligation to obey the law is a requirement that does not necessarily extend to every element of an actus
reus."); Jeremy Horder, A Critique of the Correspondence Principle, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 759, 764 ("The fact
that I deliberately wrong V arguably changes my normative position vis h vis the risk of adverse consequences
of that wrongdoing to V, whether or not foreseen or reasonably foreseeable."); Dan M. Kahan, Is Ignorance of
Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2123, 2123-25 (1998) (defending Bramwell's
analysis in Prince). For a critical response to Gardner, see Andrew Ashworth, A Change of Normative
Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in Criminal Law, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 232 (2008), to
which Gardner briefly responds in JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 246-48 (2007).
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guilty mind. But what if we say that an actor's culpability consists simply in
the possession of mens rea, and mens rea consists in defiance of the law? Are
the moral and legal wrong doctrines defensible then?
It depends on what the actor must defy before he can be said to have acted
with a guilty mind. Must he defy the particular law he is charged with defying,
or does it suffice that he defy, as we might say, the Law? If culpability consists
in defiance of law, then Prince was punished more harshly than he deserved.
He was punished as if he had culpably defied the law against taking girls under
sixteen from the custody of their non-consenting parents, when in fact he
(merely) defied the moral law against taking girls of any age from the custody
of their non-consenting parents. In contrast, if culpability consists in defiance
of the Law, then Prince may or may not have gotten what he deserved. It
depends on what anyone who defies the Law deserves for such defiance, no
matter what particular law they defy. 38 Without more, the defiance account of
culpability and the guilty mind lacks the resources to resolve this question one
way or the other.39
The problem reflected in Prince persists to this day. Take, for example,
Bryan v. United States.40 The defendant Sillasse Bryan bought handguns from
people who had in turn purchased them from legitimate dealers in Ohio. After
filing off the serial numbers so the guns could not be traced back to the original
purchasers, Bryan sold them illegally on the streets of Brooklyn. He was
charged with "willfully" violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), which made it
unlawful to do so to engage, without a license, "in the business... of dealing in
firearms." Everyone agreed that the government was required to prove that
Bryan realized he was violating the law when he sold the guns. But what law?
Was it enough to prove that he realized he was doing something-anything-
unlawful, or was the government required to prove that he realized he was
acting unlawfully because he was dealing in firearms without a license?
Like the court in Prince, the Court in Bryan was divided. The majority
held that the government was required to prove only that Bryan realized he was
violating the Law,4' and Bryan had conceded that point. The dissent, having
finally been forced to make resort to the rule of lenity, would have required the
government to prove that Bryan realized not only that he was violating the Law,
38. If the relevant object of defiance is the Law, it would seem to follow that an actor who kills another
knowing that the law forbids so doing should be (retributively) punished the same as an actor who commits a
malumprohibitum offense knowing the law forbids so doing, since both commit the same crime: defiance of
the Law. Indeed, if mens rea consists in defiance of the Law, then defiance of the Law is the only 'real"
crime anyone can commit.
39. For what it's worth, Hampton apparently believed that Prince was not defiant, and so lacked mens
rea, see HAMPTON, Mens Rea, supra note 4, at 105 ("[I]t seems improper to claim that... a person [such as
Prince] is defiant of the law."), which would in turn suggest that she took the object of defiance to be the law,
not the Law.
40. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
41. Id. at 196 ("[The willfulness requirement of§ 924(a)(1)(D) does not carve out an exception to the
traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is
required.").
HeinOnline -- 42 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 371 2009
TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW
but also that he realized the law he was violating: it would have required the
government to prove that he realized his sales on the streets of Brooklyn were
illegal because they constituted dealing in firearms without a license.42 Again,
without more, the defiance account of mens rea cannot settle the question, and
for now, I too will leave it unsettled.43
III. SHOULD AN "UNREASONABLE" MISTAKE OF FACT LOSE ITS
EXCULPATORY FORCE?
An actor acts with mens rea if and when he acts in defiance of the Law or
law, as the case may be. A mistake of fact should therefore provide the basis
for an excuse, all else being equal, if and when it causes an actor to act without
such defiance. One might nonetheless insist that an actor who would otherwise
be excused because he acts without defiance should forfeit that excuse if and
because the mistake of fact causing his ignorance of the law is "unreasonable."
In other words, a mistake of fact should lose any exculpatory force it would
otherwise possess if and because it is "unreasonable."
Here I examine three accounts of the conditions under which an actor can
fairly be held responsible for forming what is admittedly an "unreasonable"
belief. I conclude that although we sometimes form unreasonable beliefs, we
are never responsible for those beliefs, or to be more precise: we are never
responsible for them when being responsible means being liable to censure in
the form of state punishment. If so, then the fact that a mistake of fact can be
characterized as "unreasonable" should give no reason to withdraw from that
mistake any exculpatory force it would otherwise possess. But let me begin
with some background on the law of mistakes of fact.
42. Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The commentators also disagree on the proper resolution.
Compare Wiley, supra note 16, at 1134 (arguing that Bryan was correctly decided), with Sharon L. Davies,
The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 383-86
(1998) (suggesting that Bryan was wrongly decided).
43. 1 was asked at the symposium at which this paper was presented how the approach I offer would
deal with the facts of the notorious Morgan case. See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, [ 1976] A.C. 182.
My answer is that it depends on what those facts were. First, as for Morgan (the victim's husband) he seems
clearly to have realized that his wife was not consenting, and so was properly convicted of rape as an
accomplice. Second, as for the three allegedly unwitting airmen, the answer would depend on whether they
really did lack any suspicion that the victim was not consenting. If they harbored some doubt as to her
consent, they were properly convicted of rape. But if not, then they should have been acquitted, for insofar as
they genuinely believed that the victim was (despite her resistance) consenting, they presumably harbored no
suspicion that they were acting contrary to the law's demands. Third, having said that, I would note that,
despite their disagreement as to the applicable law, none of the Law Lords hearing the appeal believed that the
three airmen would have been acquitted had the jury been told, not (as it was told) that it should acquit if its
members believed that the airmen reasonably believed that the victim was consenting, but instead (as Morgan
held it should have been told) that it should acquit if its members believed the airmen believed (reasonably or
not) that the victim was consenting. In other words, none of the Law Lords believed that the mistake in the
jury instruction made any difference to the verdict in the case. See id. at 204 (opinion of Lord Cross.); id. at
215 (opinion of Lord Hailsham); id. at 221 (opinion of Lord Simon); id. at 235 (opinion of Lord Edmund-
Davies); id. at 239 (opinion of Lord Fraser).
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A. Mistake of Fact and Mentes Reae
Consider People v. Navarro.44 The defendant in the case took four
wooden beams from a construction site, and he intended to keep them. He was
charged with larceny, which makes the trespassory (i.e., non-consensual) taking
and carrying away of the personal property of another, with the intent
permanently to deprive the other of that property, a crime. The beams Navarro
stole were in fact someone else's, but Navarro believed that they were
abandoned. As such, he did not believe that he was taking and carrying away
the personal property of another. He believed that he was taking and carrying
away no one's personal property. Does his mistake afford him a defense to the
charge?
The orthodox view is that it depends: it depends on what the statute under
which he was prosecuted says with respect to what, if any, mental state the state
must prove he possessed as to the fact that the beams were in fact the personal
property of another. The court said that the State was required to prove that
Navarro knew the beams were stolen, such that if in fact he believed that the
beams had been abandoned, he was not guilty of the crime. His ignorance of
the fact that the beams were in fact the property of another would have meant
that the State had failed to carry its burden of proof with respect to a material
element of the offense for which it was required to carry that burden.
Consequently, Navarro would have had a valid failure-of-proof defense.
But what if the court had read the statute differently? What if some other
mental state, instead of knowledge, had been the mental state the State was
required to prove? If we look to the options the Model Penal Code provides,
one possibility would have been that Navarro was "reckless" with respect to the
fact that the beams were another's property.
Yet figuring out precisely what it means to say that an actor recklessly
believes thatp is not so simple. Based on the Code's definition of recklessness
with respect to an attendant circumstance, an actor is reckless "when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists.' 45 Such an actor is presumably one who actually believes that
not-p (or at least does not believe thatp) while at the same time believing that a
substantial and unjustifiable risk exists thatp. As it turns out, what it means to
say that an actor holds a reckless belief depends on whether one emphasizes the
substantiality of the risk that p, or its unjustifiability.
If we emphasize the substantiality of the risk that p and think about
substantiality in terms of the actor's confidence in the truth ofp, or conversely
in terms of his doubts aboutp, it makes perfectly good sense to say that an actor
believes that not-p but at the same time harbors some doubt and suspects that
44. People v. Navarro, 160 Cal. Rptr. 692 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1979).
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
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p.46 An actor need not wait until he is absolutely certain about something
before he can intelligibly be said to believe it. Thus, Navarro would have been
reckless with respect to the fact that the beams were another's property if he
believed that they were in fact abandoned, but nonetheless harbored some
doubt with respect to that fact, though not so much so that it would no longer
make sense to say that he believed that they were abandoned.47
But what if we emphasize unjustifiability? 48 Now we have a problem. If
we emphasize the unjustifiability of the risk that p, we are presumably to
imagine an actor who believes that not-p and at the same time believes that an
unjustifiable risk exists that p. In other words, we are presumably to imagine
that Navarro believes that the beams are abandoned and at the same time
believes that an unjustifiable risk exists that the beams are not abandoned. In
still other words, we are to imagine that Navarro believes that the beams are
abandoned and at the same time believes that he ought to believe (presumably
on epistemic grounds alone) that they are not abandoned.
If that sounds like an irrational state of mind in which to find oneself, it is.
It describes an actor in a state of what might be called epistemic akrasia.49
According to some, such a state is merely irrational;50 according to others, it's
not only irrational: it's conceptually impossible.5  For now, I will leave this
issue aside, noting only that an actor who is reckless with respect to the fact
that p is probably best understood as one who believes that not-p while at the
same time harboring a suspicion (in contrast to a full-blown belief) that p.
The idea that an actor could be reckless with respect to an attendant
circumstance was an innovation of the Model Penal Code, unknown to the
common law. At common law the principal distinction was between reasonable
mistakes and unreasonable ones. (The Code draws the same distinction in
terms of non-negligent mistakes and negligent ones).5 2 If a legislature wanted
to make an unreasonable mistake a failure-of-proof defense, so be it. But in the
absence of such a legislative command, a mistake was a defense only if it was
reasonable. The law has ever since been trying to figure out what it means to
say that an actor's mistaken belief that p was reasonable or not.
46. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.4 263 (1997); Kenneth W. Simons, Exploring the
Intricacies of the Lesser Evil Defense, 24 LAW & PHIL. 645, 662 (2005).
47. Of course, an actor's doubts about the existence of a fact may be so strong that it would no longer
make sense to say that he believed that p. We would instead say that he merely suspected that p.
48. See Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Defense, 24 LAW & PHIL.
611,624 (2005).
49. Much the same criticism has been directed at the MPC's definition of"wilful blindness," which is
found at § 2.02(7). See id. at 626 n.34.
50. See, e.g., David Owens, EpistemicAkrasia, 85 MONIST 381, 395 (2002).
51. See, e.g., Alfred Mele, Incontinent Believing, 36 PHIL. Q. 212, 217 (1986).
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2Xd) (1985).
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B. Responsibility for Unreasonable Beliefs
Let me begin with an assumption: Characterizing an actor's belief as
"unreasonable" is another way of saying that the belief was "unjustified," or in
other words, that the actor ought not to have possessed or formed that belief,
and that he should have possessed or formed some other cognitive attitude
toward the relevant proposition instead. Thus, if Navarro's belief that the
beams were abandoned, and thus his ignorance of the fact that they were the
property of another, was unreasonable, then he ought not have formed that
belief: he was wrong to have done so.
Notice that this way of talking presupposes that we have epistemic
obligations, i.e., obligations to form this or that cognitive attitude, and that we
can be held responsible and subject to blame when we fail to honor those
obligations. Indeed, according to one prominent school of thought, we have but
one epistemic obligation: to form beliefs that fit our available evidence.53 An
actor who forms a belief that does not fit his evidence breaches this epistemic
obligation, and as such, his belief can then, but only then, be characterized as
"unjustified" or "unreasonable., 54
But if ought implies can, then an actor who ought to believe that p
(because his available evidence fits p), but in fact believes that not-p, can be
held responsible for failing to believe that p only if he could have believed
otherwise than he actually believed.5 Thus, an actor can be held responsible
53. This school of thought is known as evidentialism. Evidentialism claims that "[d]oxastic attitude D
toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence that
S has at t." Earl Conee & Richard Feldman, Evidentialism, in EVIDENTIALISM: ESSAYS IN EPISTEMOLOGY
81, 81 (2004). Moreover, "being epistemically obligatory is equivalent to being epistemicallyjustified." Id.
at 88. See also JONATHAN E. ADLER, BELIEF'S OWN ETHics (2002); Anthony Robert Booth, Two Faces of
Evidentialism, 67 ERKENNTNIS 401 (2007); Allen Wood, The Duty to Believe According to the Evidence, 63
INT'L J. PHIL. RELIGION 7 (2008).
54. This analysis of epistemic justification is synchronic: It is based on the evidence available to the
actor at time t-l. As such, it excludes the possibility of characterizing an actor's belief at t=1 as "unjustifed"
or "unreasonable" because that belief was the result of some prior wrongful choice the actor made for which
he might be responsible and blameworthy. See, e.g., Hilary Kornblith, Justified Belief and Epistemically
Responsible Action, 92 PHIL. REV. 33, 34 (1983); Mark Leon, Responsible Believers, 85 MONIST 421 (2002);
Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543 (1983). These prior choices can range from failing to
acquire or develop certain cognitive skills or habits, to failing to gather evidence, to (in the limiting case)
failing to exercise what might be called doxastic self-control. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, What's Wrong
with Involuntary Manslaughter?, 85 TEx. L. REV. 333 (2006). Yet insofar as the criminal law refuses to
recognize an otherwise valid excuse because of some prior choice the actor made, respect for the legality
principle would presumably require the law to spell out in advance the content of those forbidden choices.
55. Some arguments to the effect that we can be held responsible for our beliefs reject this principle:
responsibility does not require the capacity to believe otherwise. We are responsible for our beliefs even
though we could not have believed otherwise than we do because, so the argument goes, the ethics of belief is
based on role obligations or aretatic obligations or something similar, and moreover, we bear responsibility for
breaching those obligations even if we lack the capacity to believe otherwise than we actually do. See, e.g.,
Matthew Chrisman, Ought to Believe, 105 J. PHIL. 346, 358-66 (2008); Richard Feldman, Modest
Deontologism in Epistemology, 161 SYNTHESE 339, 351 (2008) (role obligations); Hilary Komblith,
Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility oflnternalism, in VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGy: ESSAYS ON EPISTEMIC
VIRTUE AND RESPONSmILrrY 231,238 (Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski eds., 2001). The only thing I
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for believing that not-p, where the evidence available to him at time t=l
supports the formation of the belief thatp, if he had at that time the capacity to
believe thatp. Assuming that the evidence available to Navarro supported the
formation of the belief that the beams were not abandoned, but Navarro
nonetheless believed that they were, his belief is fairly characterized as
unreasonable or unjustified: he was wrong to believe as he did. But Navarro is
responsible for that breach of his epistemic obligation only if he could have
formed the belief that they were not abandoned. Could he have?
If determinism is true, then the answer is no. Navarro could only have
formed the belief he actually formed, at least in the world as it actually existed
at the time he formed the belief that the beams were abandoned. Indeed, if we
assume that determinism is true, then no one could ever have believed
otherwise than he actually believes, and as such, we might say that no one is
ever responsible for what he believes. Yet sometimes we do hold people
responsible for what they believe when we believe they hold beliefs that they
ought not. We blame them for believing this or not believing that.
Consequently, if we want to make sense of that practice, we need some other
account of what it means to say that an actor could have believed otherwise
than he actually believed: an account that permits us to say that an actor could
have believed otherwise than he actually believed despite the truth of
determinism.
One analysis of the language of capacity is a simple counterfactual or
conditional analysis. If we assume the truth of determinism, when we say that
an actor could have done otherwise, we do not mean that the actor could have
done otherwise in the actual world: determinism rules out that possibility.
Instead, we mean that he could have done otherwise ifa. So, for example, the
traditional compatibilist analysis of what it means to say that an actor could
have done otherwise, and thus the traditional compatibilist analysis of what is
needed to hold an actor responsible for his actions, says that an actor is
responsible for p-ing if he could have done otherwise, and he could have done
otherwise if he had chosen to do otherwise, i.e., a = the actor's choice to do
otherwise.
56
The same analysis applies mutatis mutandis to an actor's capacity to
believe otherwise. An actor is epistemically obligated to believe that p if and
would say here is that the conception of responsibility upon which these arguments rely, though perhaps
adequate to support some forms of censure, seems to me too flimsy to support censure in the form of criminal
punishment. I should also note that I am assuming it makes sense to say that an actor can have an obligation
to qp even if he lacks the capacity to q. Some claim that it makes no sense. They argue that an actor can have
no obligation ab initio to q' if he lacks the capacity to 9.
56. This simple counterfactual analysis is too simple, but I beieve it suffices for present purposes. For
more subtle analyses of what it means to say that an actor could have done (or believed) otherwise, see
Michael Smith, Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion, in
ETHICS AND THE A PRIORI 114 (2004); Kadri Vihvelin, Free Will Demystified: A DispositionalAccount, 32
PHIL. TOPics 427 (2004). See also Bernard Berofsky, Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 181 (Robert Kane ed., 2002).
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because the evidence available to him supports the formation of the belief that
p. If an actor believes that not-p in breach of his epistemic obligation to believe
that p, he is responsible for believing that not-p if and because he could have
believed thatp, and he could have believed thatp if a, where a identifies some
difference between the actual world in which the actor believes that not-p and
some possible world in which he believes, as he is obligated to believe, thatp.
With these preliminaries in place, let me describe three accounts that
attempt to explain when and why an actor who believes in breach of his
epistemic obligation to form beliefs that fit his available evidence (and who
thus forms an unreasonable or unjustified belief) is responsible for that breach,
because he could have believed otherwise. What distinguishes these accounts
from one another is the difference they describe between the actual world in
which the actor believes that not-p (in breach of his epistemic obligation) and
the counterfactual world in which he believes that p (in conformity with that
obligation). In other words, what distinguishes the three accounts is the value
that each assigns to a.
1. Choice
One might say that an actor is responsible for failing to form the belief
that p, when the evidence available to him supported the formation of that
belief, if and because he could have chosen to believe that p. An actor is
responsible for what he believes for the same reason he is responsible for what
he does: he is responsible because he could have chosen otherwise. Although
he could not have believed otherwise than he did in the actual world (just as he
could not have done otherwise in that world), he is nonetheless responsible for
what he believes because in the relevant counterfactual world he chooses to
believe that p. On this account, Navarro is responsible for believing that the
beams were abandoned, when the evidence available to him supported the
belief that they were not, because in the relevant counterfactual world he chose
to believe, and so did believe, that they were not abandoned.
But this account never gets off the ground. It presupposes that we can
directly choose what we believe, or that we can directly will what we believe, in
the same way that we can choose to act. Yet that presupposition is false.57 Our
57. This claim is in fact a matter of considerable debate in the philosophical literature. Compare
Bernard Williams, Deciding to Believe, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 136 (1973) (arguing that we cannot choose
to believe); William Alston, The Deontological Concept ofEpistemic Justification, 2 PHIL. PERsp. 257 (1988)
(same); Neil Levy, Doxastic Responsibility, 155 SYNTHESE 127 (2007) (same), with Carl Ginet, Deciding to
Believe, in KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, AND DUTY: ESSAYS ON EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION, RESPONSIBILITY, AND
VIRTUE 63 (Matthias Steup ed., 2001) (arguing that we can choose to believe); Mark Heller, Hobartian
Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conception ofEpistemic Justification, 81 PAC. PHIL. Q. 130 (2000)
(same); Sharon Ryan, Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics ofBelief 114 PHIL. STUD. 47 (2003) (same);
Matthias Steup, Doxastic Freedom, 161 SYNTHESE 375 (2008) (same). For responses to those who claim we
can directly control our beliefs, see Andrei A. Buckareff, Compatibilism and Doxastic Control, 34
PHILOSOPHIA 143 (2006) (responding to Ryan) [hereinafter Bukareff, Doxastic Control]; Andrei A.
Buckareff, Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief 21 ACTA ANALYTICA 102 (2006) (responding to
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actions respond directly to our wills, but our beliefs do not. On the contrary,
when all goes well, our beliefs respond only to the world, i.e., our evidence, as
they usually should. Believing is not like acting. Believing is like vomiting.58
We can indeed do things that might induce vomiting (should the need arise),
just as we can do things that might cause us to form this or that belief.59
Nonetheless, we cannot vomit in the same way that we can raise an arm, nor
can we form beliefs in that way. We cannot directly will to vomit, and we
cannot directly will to believe.
Navarro did not choose directly to believe that the beams were abandoned.
Nor could he have chosen directly to believe that they were not. A possible
world might exist in which we do have the will to believe, but if so, that world
is very distant from ours. If Navarro is responsible for failing to believe that the
beams were the property of another, then the locus of his responsibility must be
found somewhere other than in his choice directly to believe that they either
were or were not someone else's property, because he had no such choice.
2. Orthodoxy
Turn now to the law's own account (such as it is). When jurors are asked
to decide if an actor's belief is reasonable or not, the law gives them little
guidance, usually not much more than: "Convict if you believe that a
reasonable person in Navarro's situation would not have believed the beams
were abandoned; acquit if you believe that a reasonable person in Navarro's
situation would have believed that they were abandoned." Students of the
criminal law usually say that the answer one gives depends on how far the law
should go in "subjectivizing" the reasonable person.
When a subjectivist imagines the reasonable person, he imagines someone
more or less like the defendant, and as such, subjectivists are more inclined
than objectivists to say that a defendant's false belief is one for which he should
not be held responsible. In contrast, when an objectivist imagines the
reasonable person, he imagines someone stripped of whatever properties
distance him from some ideal of rationality and vested with whatever properties
are needed to bring him closer to that ideal, and as such, objectivists are more
inclined than subjectivists to say that the defendant's false believe is one for
which he should be held responsible.
Steup); Andrei A. Buckareff, Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deonologism, 2 DISPUTATIO 1 (2006)
(responding to Heller); Andrei A. Buckareff, Acceptance and Deciding to Believe, 29 J. PHIL. RES. 173(2004)
(responding to Ginet).
58. See Buckarff, Doxastic Control, supra note 56, at 149. Or maybe digesting: An actor's
"responsibility for maintaining her own health means that she is responsible for the type of digester she is, but
[s] he is not responsible for this token digestion." Brian Weatherson, Deontology andDescartes'Demon, 105
J. PHIL. 540, 541 (2008).
59. One can also choose to accept a belief one holds, but accepting is not believing. See L. JONATHAN
COHEN, AN ESSAY ON BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE (1992).
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Once we conjure the reasonable person, we then ask the counterfactual
question: Would the reasonable person have believed that p, assuming the
evidence available to him supported the formation of that belief, as did the
evidence available to the defendant? The answer might seem obvious: Of
course the reasonable person would have formed that belief. The reasonable
person always and only forms beliefs that fit his evidence. But the more one
subjectivizes the reasonable person, the less "reasonable" the reasonable person
may become. In any event, if the reasonable person would have believed thatp,
then defendant could have believed thatp in the counterfactual world in which
he is the reasonable person. The defendant's belief that not-p is therefore
"unreasonable," and labeling his belief "unreasonable" can be understood as
the law's way of saying that the actor should have believed thatp (because the
evidence available to him supported its formation), and moreover, that he is
responsible for failing to believe that p.
For example, imagine that Navarro has a passion for wooden beams.
Collecting them is his life's onejoy. When Navarro came across the beams, all
the evidence available to him at the moment he took them supported the
formation of the belief that the beams were not abandoned. Navarro
nonetheless formed the belief that they were. Perhaps in order to avoid the
anxiety he would experience if he did not take the beams, his desire to believe
that the beams were abandoned directed his mind to attend to certain features of
the situation and ignore others, such that he ended up actually believing that the
world was as he wanted it to be: the beams were abandoned, and he could take
them for his collection without consequence.
In order to decide whether or not Navarro was responsible for believing
that the beams were stolen, the orthodox account instructs us to ask, among
other things, whether Navarro's passion for wooden beams-a passion but for
which he would not have believed the beams were abandoned-is a property
he shares with the reasonable person. Is the reasonable person a beam-lover?
If not, then perhaps the world we are to imagine is one in which Navarro
encounters the beams, but with the single difference being that he no longer
possesses his passion for them. We then ask whether, stripped of his passion,
he would have believed that the beams were abandoned. If not, then his belief
that they were abandoned is deemed "unreasonable," which again is to say that
he should not have believed that they were abandoned, and moreover, that he is
responsible for forming the belief that they were abandoned.
Unfortunately, the law's account of the counterfactual world the jury is
asked to imagine in order to decide whether or not an actor had the capacity to
form the belief he should have formed (but did not) has one big problem:
indeterminacy. The law simply does not say which facts in the actual world do
not exist in the counterfactual world, nor does it say which facts that do not
exist in the actual world exist in the counterfactual one. On the contrary, it
avoids the issue. All we know is that the reasonable person in the
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counterfactual world is in the same "situation" as the actor in the actual world.6°
In other words, the law assigns no value to a. It punts a to the jury.
Moreover, according to some, this indeterminancy goes deep indeed. Not
only does the law not describe the relevant counterfactual world, it can't, at
least not in any principled way, because no such way exists by which to fix the
facts of the counterfactual world.6' Any proposal to exclude this fact, but not
that one, or to include this fact, but not that one, is bound to be arbitrary, or so
the argument goes. That leaves only the extremes: the actual world in which
the reasonable person is the defendant, and a counterfactual world in which the
reasonable person is the model of rationality. Unfortunately, both these
extremes lead nowhere.
If the relevant world is the actual world, then no one will ever be held
responsible for believing in violation of his epistemic duty to form beliefs that
fit the available evidence, because in the actual world no one has the capacity to
believe otherwise than he actually believes. That's why the analysis of capacity
needed to proceed in counterfactual terms in the first place. But if the relevant
world is a counterfactual one in which the defendant has been transformed into
the model of rationality, we will end up having made no progress. We turned
to counterfactuals in order to determine if and when an actor who forms beliefs
in violation of his epistemic duty to form beliefs that fit his available evidence
could be held responsible for that breach because he could have believed
otherwise. But if the actor in the counterfactual world is ideally rational, he
never breaches his epistemic duty to form beliefs that fit his evidence. As such,
a counterfactual world populated with an ideally rational agent cannot help us
answer the question we want to answer.
If we want to be able to say that sometimes we should be held responsible
when we believe contrary to our evidence, but not all the time, then the truth
must lie somewhere in between these two extremes.
3. Indifference
The next account can be understood as an effort to find this middle
ground, and so too as a reply to the charge of deep indeterminacy. The
challenge is to provide a principled reason for excluding some facts about the
actual world from the counterfactual one, but not others; or inserting some facts
into the counterfactual world not present in the actual one, but not others.
According to what might be called the indifference theory, the one and only
difference that exists between the actual world and the counterfactual one is
that the actor in the actual world does not care enough about his fellow citizens,
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985).
61. See Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and
Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 84, 100 (1990).
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whereas in the counterfactual world he does care.62 Insofar as the actor in the
actual world is indifferent to interests the criminal law protects, he is in the
relevant counterfactual world transformed into someone who does care;
otherwise, he is the same in both worlds. Furthermore, the difference between
caring and not caring is, so the argument goes, a principled one.
For example, if Navarro failed to form the belief that the beams were not
abandoned because and just because he could have cared less about the
property rights of others, the indifference account asks us to imagine a
counterfactual world alike in every respect to the actual world at the moment
Navarro formed the belief that the beams were abandoned, except for the fact
that counterfactual Navarro does care about those rights. If counterfactual
Navarro, now vested with due concern for the property rights of others, would
have realized that the beams were not abandoned, then according to the
indifference account, Navarro in the actual world could have likewise so
believed, and insofar as he should have so believed, he is responsible for not so
believing.
The indifference account holds an actor responsible (and prima facie liable
to punishment) for forming a belief at odds with his available evidence, and
thus in breach of his epistemic duty to form beliefs that fit his available
evidence, if and because he formed that belief (and failed to form the belief he
should have formed) because he was in the relevant sense indifferent. The
problem with this account is that when it ends up holding an actor responsible
for what he believes it does so because it holds him responsible for who he is.
It ends up punishing him for being indifferent. Let me explain.
Go back to Navarro. Navarro is of course punished because he took the
beams. Had he not taken them, he would not have found himself in any
trouble. But he took the beams only because he believed that they were there
for the taking, and he only believed that they were there for the taking because
(we are now assuming) he did not care as much about the property rights of
others as he should have. Consequently, the indifference theory would say that
Navarro was responsible for believing the beams were abandoned because he
was indifferent-perhaps characteristically or perhaps on this occasion alone
-and for being unlucky enough to find himself in a situation in which his
indifference caused the formation of a belief but for which he presumably
would not have taken the beams. In the end, therefore, he is punished because
62. Criminal-law scholars who defend this account include, for example, R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR
CRIME 296 (2007); Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal
Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 388 (1994); Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable
Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 151 (2008). Philosophers who defend it include, for
example, Robert Merrihew Adams, Involuntary Sins, 94 PHIL. REV. 3 (1985); Pamela Hieronymi,
Responsibility for Believing, 161 SYNTHESE 357 (2008); George Sher, Out of Control, 116 ETHICS 285
(2006); Angela M. Smith, Responsibilityfor Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in MentalLife, 115 ETHICS 236
(2005). In the philosophical literature, what I am calling the indifference account of responsibility is often
called "attributionism," in contrast to "volitionalism." See Neil Levy, The Good, the Bad, and the
Blameworthy, 1 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 2 (2005).
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he was indifferent, and unlucky enough to find himself in a situation in which
his indifference blinded him to the truth.
In the final analysis, the indifference account punishes a person for being
indifferent. True, the person must do something that constitutes a crime, but he
remains blissfully unaware of the fact that what he is doing is a crime. If and
when the law condemns him, what is it condemning him for? The honest
answer would seem to be that he is in the end condemned for having been
indifferent, and punishing a person for being indifferent is punishing him for
who he is. But that is something the criminal law of a liberal state should not
do.
We can and properly do in our everyday lives blame and criticize one
another for the vices that corrupt our characters, and corrupt characters can
cause us to form beliefs we would not otherwise form. The indifference
account explains these everyday features of our lives. It constitutes one, and
probably the best, explanation for why we do in fact hold people responsible
and blame them for the beliefs they possess when we believe that they should
have believed otherwise.
But blame and criticism without more is one thing. Punishment is
another. We can and do blame and criticize without intending to cause
suffering, but suffering is precisely what the state intends when it punishes. It
constitutes the medium through which the state conveys its condemnation.
Because punishment ups the condemnatory ante, it should be reserved for the
wrongs we choose to do, not the vices we possess, and we do not directly
choose to form beliefs at odds with our evidence in breach of our epistemic
duty. We directly choose none of our beliefs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let me reiterate two points in closing. First, a mistake of fact should
excuse if and because it causes an agent to be ignorant of the law he is charged
with having violated, even if that mistake is in some plausible and legitimate
sense unreasonable. We may violate our epistemic duty to form beliefs that fit
our available evidence, but the state should not blame us for any such breach, at
least not where blaming means punishing. Second, even if the immediately
foregoing claim is wrong-headed, criminal law scholars should in any event
stop thinking about mistakes of fact as nothing more than failure of proof
defenses. They should start thinking of them again as excuses, and asking
when and why they excuse, if and when they do.
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